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The Arctic Council’s (AC) openness to the outside world has become an increasingly 
important issue in the current debate on its shape and place in the Arctic governance 
structure. The growing interest of states such as China and entities like the European 
Union in obtaining Observer status on the Council, and the search for an enhanced 
role by existing Observers, has triggered an emotional debate between the Arctic 
states, Observers and Permanent Participants. Admission of new non-Arctic actors 
as Observers and strengthening the role of the status might have broader 
consequences for the Council’s design, functioning and general direction in which 
international relations in the Arctic would unfold. This article attempts to develop a 
new concept of the place and form of the Arctic Council from the perspective of a 
redefined non-Arctic participation. It seeks the most appropriate way of involvement 
of non-regional players into the Arctic Council’s activities that would be congruent 
with all parties’ interests and would not encroach upon the unique character of the 
Council. To achieve this goal, a three-step approach is employed. First, earlier 
concepts about the improvement of the Arctic Council are briefly reviewed and 
summarised. Second, the stances and policies of the Arctic states on the reform of the 
AC are explored. Third, the current political context in reference to the Observer 
debate is described. The new concept is introduced within the framework set by 
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Arctic change, driven by receding icecaps and globalization (ACIA, 2005; 
Koivurova, 2010; Heininen and Southcott, 2010), has triggered a debate on how to 
adapt the existing regional governance system to the challenges posed by these 
developments. A central role in the international architecture of the North has 
been assigned to the Arctic Council (AC), the premier circumpolar 
intergovernmental forum. Despite successes under the auspices of the AC, such as 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Human Development Report 
and the Agreement on Search and Rescue in the Arctic, today’s picture of the 
Council emerging from the academic and media discussions suggests that it is not 
well-suited to govern a rapidly changing Arctic (Koivurova, 2009; Young, 2009b; 
Koivurova and Hasanat, 2009).  
 
Particularly challenging for the Arctic Council seems to be the growing global 
interest to participate in its works, driven mainly by emerging economic 
opportunities and environmental concerns as well as political and strategic issues 
(Berkman and Young, 2009). A number of outside actors, including China, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea and the European Union have shown their intention of being 
included in the affairs of the region by applying for Observer status at the forum, 
while those already accorded this standing seek an increased role within the 
Council’s structures (Graczyk, 2011). This, however, has been met with certain 
reluctance from the Arctic states and Permanent Participants of the AC (AAC, 
2007; ICC, 2010; Graczyk, 2011). The AC, which was conceived before climate 
change became so readily apparent in the region, and global interest in the region 
mounted, suffers from deficiencies that impede its ability to adapt to the changing 
political and environmental realities (Young, 2000; Young, 2009a; Haavisto, 2001; 
Koivurova, 2006; Koivurova, 2009; Koivurova and Hasanat, 2009). One problem is 
that differences between the Arctic states make it difficult to apply any significant 
changes to the Council’s mode of action that could strengthen its position in the 
future Arctic governance system. Given the currently evolving nature of Arctic 
politics, the question of non-Arctic actor participation may be seen as one of the 
factors that will have significant impact on the shape of the regional co-operation 
structure that emerges. 
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The present article offers a view on the possible reform of the Arctic Council’s 
role, structure and rules of procedure in a wider perspective of involvement of 
non-Arctic actors and increasing interest of the outside world in Arctic affairs. 
First, however, it attempts to briefly review and summarise selected proposals for 
and visions of the AC’s place in the regional governance structure, along with 
envisioned enhancements, and what actually has been done to improve its 
performance. Ideas developed in this paper take these concepts as a point of 
departure. Furthermore, the recently issued Arctic policy documents of interested 
parties are also examined with respect to the AC. The purpose of that is to set a 
realistic framework for further considerations that could be consistent with 
positions and interests of the Arctic countries. 
 
It is essential to identify propositions that have been applied by the member states 
(entirely or partially) and those which were rejected or did not meet with their 
interest. This reveals the main obstacles and particularly sensitive areas in the 
Arctic states’ policies within which they could be reluctant to agree to changes. To 
outline a new vision, first an overview of what has already been suggested is 
provided, then these recommendations are juxtaposed with the official Arctic 
governments’ statements and the Arctic Council documents. Finally, on this basis, 
a refreshed proposal for the AC’s architecture and the rules of procedure along 
with an imaginable way of implementation is advanced.  
 
The ideas offered by this paper are based on certain assumptions that have been 
formulated after interviews and consultations with Arctic and non-Arctic 
governments’ officials, NGO and indigenous representatives, as well as researchers 
involved in the Arctic Council projects. To some extent they are also based on the 
author’s personal experience from participation in the Arctic Council meetings 
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Debate on the role and shape of the 
Arctic Council 
 
Much attention and research in recent years have focused on the governance 
structure of the Arctic including the role of the Arctic Council (Young 2000; 
Young, 2009a; Young, 2009b; Young, 2010; Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007; 
Huebert, 2008; Huebert and Yeager, 2008; Koivurova, 2009; Koivurova and 
Molenaar, 2010). Finding a proper place for the Council within the rapidly 
changing international environment in the Far North appears to be problematic. 
The reasons for this are complex and differ due to national interests, diverse views 
on Arctic co-operation and governance, and discrepant definitions of legitimate 
stakeholders – a crucial question when according Observer status. There are also 
contrasting expert opinions as to sufficiency of the existing governance framework 
in the Arctic (mainly pertaining to the marine Arctic) which, according to some 
academics, does not fulfill its role (Huebert, 2008; Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010), 
whilst in view of others there are all necessary mechanisms already in place 
(Stokke, 2007; Hoel, 2009). The position of the only intergovernmental forum 




Since the establishment of the Arctic Council, and even at the negotiation stage 
(Scrivener, 1996; Keskitalo, 2004), many of its limitations have become apparent. 
The catalogue of hindrances impeding the works of the Council is relatively wide 
and well-known. It includes issues pertaining to a general role of the concerned 
forum in the international system, lack of legal basis, limited mandate, structural 
shortcomings, indigent communication and outreach capabilities, and quite 
specific questions concerning scope definition of the Working Groups work and 
project financing. 
  
Criticism focused primarily on a soft law profile of the Council’s mandate based 
on a declaration not a treaty (Koivurova, 2006, 2009; Huebert, 2008; Huebert and 
Yeager, 2008; Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010), insufficient or no implementation 
monitoring of self-imposed recommendations and guidelines (Koivurova, 2006; 
Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010) and avoiding certain themes, like fisheries or 
security (geopolitical) issues (Huebert, 2008; Huebert and Yeager, 2008). In 
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addition, it has been pointed out that the Council is mistakenly based on twin 
pillars of sustainable development and environmental protection, which in reality 
prove to be both overlapping and competing (Young, 2000; Haavisto, 2001). 
Concerns have also been raised about the long-term policy of the Council, as 
strategic directions are subject to shifts as the chairmanships rotate every two years 
(Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the division of labour between the AC’s Working Groups limits the 
ability to handle complex and interrelated questions emerging from the changes 
occurring in the Arctic (Huebert and Yeager, 2008) and in certain cases (like 
AMAP and CAFF) their mandates overlap (Young, 2000). Additionally, the 
performance of the Working Groups is further undermined by deficient 
communication between them, inadequate contacts between the WGs and the 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAO)s and competition for the same financial resources 
(Haavisto, 2001). Another aspect of the Working Groups’ work is acceptance of 
the projects that do not have a circumpolar scope, what may cause both resource 
dispersion and divergence from the mandate and region-wide focus (Haavisto, 
2001).  
 
Communication and outreach problems still remain unresolved in a satisfactory 
way, nonetheless studies and recommendations have been prepared and submitted 
to the Council at its request (Haavisto, 2001; Turunen and Kankaanpää, 2002; 
SAO Report, April 2009; AC Communications and Outreach Contact Group, 
October 2010;  CCGS and WDGF, May 2011). Identified gaps and shortcomings 
include, inter alia, little knowledge about Council’s activities even among northern 
residents and indigenous peoples, limited institutional knowledge or insufficient 
flow of information from the Council to a wide public both locally and globally 
(CCGS and WDGF, May 2011). This, as well as a lack of clear policy on priorities, 
also affects co-operation with other Arctic institutions, which should be better 
structured (Haavisto, 2001). 
 
Finally, many authors have drawn attention to the issue of Observers, primarily 
non-Arctic actors, as not convincingly resolved. The main criticism focused on 
their limited participation (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010; Koivurova 2010a) as 
well as an unclear definition of their role within the Council and criteria for their 
admission (Haavisto, 2001; Keskitalo, 2004). To a certain extent, it might be also 
said, there is a tendency to disregard links between challenges in the Arctic and 
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their sources in the South (Young, 2009a; Young, 2009b), as well as concern of 
outside actors about the developments in the region that may affect areas far below 
the Arctic Circle, causing frustration among non-Arctic entities (Young, 2009b; 
Young, 2010). Furthermore, a growing reluctance towards these actors can be 
observed. Recently, it was perceived (by some non-Arctic states) that there was an 
intentional reduction in the role of the Observers as guaranteed by the Arctic 
Council Rules of Procedure during negotiations on the Search and Rescue 
instrument (Graczyk, 2011). 
 
This list is not exhaustive, but should outline a wide picture of the most immediate 
and critical problems the Council has to face in coming years. Until recently, it 
contained issues of a permanent secretariat, regular funding, and a lack of 
institutional memory (e.g. Molenaar and Koivurova, 2010). However, these 
problems were addressed at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting, where the Arctic states 
decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (Nuuk 
Declaration, May 2011; cf. SAO Report, May 2011) and, along with the allocation 
of 10 million euro towards Pollution Prevention Initiatives by Russia, the 
requirements to launch the Project Support Instrument had been met (SAO 
Report, May 2011). This provides more reliable – but not permanent – funding for 
the AC’s projects on the elimination of contaminants in the Arctic, primarily 
carried out by the ACAP Working Group. Moreover, it is seen as a precedent for 
funding other Council projects (SAO Report, May 2011). The criteria for 
admitting new Observers and a role for their participation in the AC have also 
been defined. Yet, this has not entirely resolved the problem as the disappointment 
of some Observer countries and non-Arctic state applicants to the status has 
already been noted (Larsen, 2011). 
 
Proposals for the reform 
Comprehensive reform of the Arctic Council is not a feasible task for the present 
Swedish Chairmanship, nor even the subsequent Canadian one. It will require a 
well-designed step-by-step approach towards the ultimate goal of redefining the 
role of the Council appropriate to the international and environmental realities 
and its ability to quickly react if new challenges emerge. Nevertheless, many of the 
above mentioned studies offered options for changes within the Council that could 
possibly improve its capabilities, make it more efficient and free of certain 
shortcomings. It is also important to note that the AC’s subsequent Chairmanships 
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have initiated discussions and activities towards strengthening its role and 
improving its structures (Arctic Council Capacity Building Workshop, November 
2001; SAO Report, April 2009; SAO Report, May 2011).  
 
The focus and scope of the proposals ranged from very specific issues and detailed 
solutions applicable to narrow areas, to comprehensive concepts placing the 
Council within the regional structure of governance. It seems, therefore, 
indispensable to briefly examine these proposals and point out the main issue 
areas on which they generally focus on. This is expected to provide a useful basis 
for developing a new concept on the possible reform of the Arctic Council. 
 
Many authors and researchers have sought the most felicitous place for the 
Council within the landscape of international initiatives in the Far North. Often it 
was driven by disappointment with the actual performance of the only 
circumpolar intergovernmental body and high expectations that such an 
institution could solve many regional problems stemming from the effects of 
climate change. Furthermore, issues of structural deficiencies and participation of 
stakeholders other than the Arctic countries have been raised. Finally, some 
authors identified areas in regional governance in which certain improvements are 
needed and the Council could play an important role in filling existing gaps.   
 
First and foremost, the question of the place of the Council within the governance 
of the Arctic and its relations with the other institutions has been raised (e.g. 
Young, 2000; Stokke, 2007; Stokke and Hønneland, 2007; Koivurova and 
Molenaar, 2010). It was recommended that it should focus on regional issues and 
those which give it a comparative advantage given its limited mandate (Young, 
2000). Such a niche approach (Stokke and Hønneland, 2007) assumes that the AC 
should keep and further advance its function in producing influential and well-
researched assessments and guidelines pertaining to the most pending challenges 
in the Far North (e. g. Young, 2000; Young, 2009b; Young, 2010; Stokke and 
Hønneland, 2007; Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007; Koivurova, 2009). The AC 
could also play a key role in strengthening implementation of existing (and 
possibly also future) international agreements pertaining to the Arctic and co-
ordinate their application (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010). As recent 
developments have illustrated in respect of the Search and Rescue agreement, it is 
also possible that the AC could become a platform for negotiating legally-binding 
agreements (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010). Some authors have suggested that 
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the Arctic Council could be a good and desirable place for developing a regional 
seas agreement as envisaged under the Regional Seas Programme of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (Huebert and Yeager, 2008; Exner-Poirot, 2011; 
cf. Young, 2000; Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010).  
 
Internationally, the Arctic Council should be nested within the broader 
international structure of regional co-operation, where it could perform tasks in 
setting the policy agenda. Accordingly, it would require interplay with other 
institutions already in place (Stokke, 2007). The AC could also be a part of a 
tripartite “governance complex”, comprising agreement stabilizing jurisdictional 
claims and boundary issues, the AC as a linkage between Arctic and the outside 
world as it comes to global concerns like climate change, and the development of 
issue-specific regulative regimes to address concerns involving questions like 
shipping or offshore oil and gas (Young, 2009b). 
 
As to strengthening the internal structure, there are opinions that the scope of 
Council’s activities should be expanded to include issues of fisheries, marine 
mammals (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007; Huebert and Yeager, 2008) as well 
as political (Norwegian MFA, April 2005) and security-related (Huebert, 2008) co-
operation. According to some studies, it would be beneficial to abandon the AC’s 
current mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development and to 
reorganize the work of the Council around a larger number of issues (Young, 
2000; Young, 2009b). This could also allow a better division of labour between the 
Working Groups. In addition, creating new Working Groups to address issues like 
fisheries, marine living resources and “enhancing the social and cultural 
environment of Northern territories” (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007; 
Huebert and Yeager, 2008), were advanced. To increase an “Arctic voice” in other 
relevant fora and keep the Council abreast of the international processes in fields 
of its interest, Timo Koivurova and David VanderZwaag proposed the formation 
of an International Co-operation Working Group, or some kind of committee for 
external relations (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007; cf. Ronson, 2011). This 
body could also review treaties and regulations pertaining to the region.  
 
One of the most important roles of the Arctic Council has been seen in providing 
an Arctic perspective to various international institutions, primarily those with a 
global range (Young, 2000, 2009b; Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007), and 
boosting understanding of phenomena occurring in the region among 
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Southerners. To increase the visibility of the Council, both among the Northerners 
and worldwide, several recommendations have been made, mainly by expert 
groups at the request of the SAOs. The most critical suggestions include 
development of a communications strategy for the Arctic Council, hiring a person 
responsible for media relations, utilizing a wide-range of mass media, publishing 
the Arctic Council Bulletin, and to intensify interaction between Arctic 
inhabitants, educational institutions and the Council (Turunen and Kankaanpää, 
2002). Recently, the Member States adopted the Strategic Communication Plan 
Guidelines prepared by the Arctic Council Communications and Outreach 
Contact Group and instructed the SAOs to develop them further (Nuuk 
Declaration, 2011). 
 
Another source of concern is a common perception of the Arctic Council as 
another top-down forum governed from capitals located outside the region 
(Young, 2000; CCGS and WDGF, May 2011). This could be alleviated by both the 
development of appropriate relations with the Northern Forum (Young, 2000) and 
inclusion of Northerners themselves in the process of setting policy priorities in 
the Arctic Council (Arctic Council Capacity Building Workshop, November 2001). 
 
Finally, many studies conclude the question of Observers as not sufficiently 
resolved and posing a potential challenge for the Arctic Council in the years to 
come (Huebert, 2008; Young, 2009a; Koivurova, 2010a; Koivurova, 2010b). Some 
authors (e.g. Young, 2000), as well as the SAO Reports (e.g. SAO Meeting Report, 
April 2008; SAO Report, April 2009) emphasize a positive input – such as research 
capabilities and financial support – which may be provided for the Arctic Council 
activities. In addition, their critical role in dealing with global processes affecting 
the Arctic has been recognized (Young, 2009b). Probably the most striking 
concern in deliberations regarding non-Arctic entities is dramatically increased 
interest in obtaining an Observer status  expressed by powerful actors like China, 
Japan, Italy and South Korea as well as the European Union (Commission), which 
emerged as a considerable challenge for the Council appearing to be unprepared 
for such a development (Koivurova, 2009; Young, 2009b; Graczyk, 2011). By the 
same token, the present stateObservers have raised a question of increasing their 
role within the AC (Koivurova, 2009; Young, 2009b; Graczyk, 2011). It was noted 
that their position may seem inadequate compared to their aspirations (Young, 
2009b; Graczyk, 2011). Simultaneously, some authors pointed out that Observers 
may pose a threat to the position of Permanent Participants (Young, 2009b; 
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Koivurova, 2010b), which was also highlighted by the Indigenous Peoples 
Organisations (IPO) themselves (ICC, 2010). 
 
Still, little has been said on how to solve this issue. One concept suggested that 
Observers could be entitled to speak during ministerial meetings and have an 
access to non-confidential material (Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010); the other 
says that there will probably be a need to include a new group of outside actors in 
some way (Young, 2009a; Young, 2009b; Koivurova, 2009), and to mitigate 
growing frustration (Young, 2009b) both of ad hoc observers and permanent ones 
stemming from the protracted application process and limited role. But what 
exactly could be done? Are there any solutions that could prove to be acceptable 
for the Member states, the Permanent Participants and Observers? It seems, 
therefore, important to devote more attention to this issue and to look for 
somewhat more specific arrangements. This will be attempted below. 
 
 
Arctic states’ visions of the Arctic 
Council 
 
When looking at what actually has been done within the Council to strengthen its 
capabilities, it should be concluded that the above mentioned suggestions and 
recommendations set forth by the subsequent AC’s Chairmanships, experts and 
scholars met with limited interest and attention from the Arctic governments. The 
possible reason for that is suggested by Timo Koivurova and Erik Molenaar, who 
pointed out that usually the proposals for the reform of the Arctic governance 
system (including the AC) “suffer from their political realism” (Koivurova and 
Molenaar, 2010). Since the AC is a product of the Arctic states, it is important to 
bear in mind that only they may assign to it any role they consider appropriate.  
 
Even though the above mentioned concepts provide complementary and relatively 
comprehensive vision of strengthening the AC, many of them did not take into 
account northern policies and the strategies of the Arctic states, which have 
become available only recently. 
 
It is fair to say that states’ attitudes might change; however, it is rather difficult 
when it comes to national interests. On the other hand, this possibility cannot be 
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completely rejected as the dynamics of international relations may force the Arctic 
states to move towards the idea, for instance, of an Arctic Treaty. It does not, 
however, seem possible in the foreseeable future. Some observers note that the 
changes occurring in the Arctic are so dynamic that “policy statements and 
strategies cannot really be seen as definitive, indeed, they often express only a 
declaration of intent or interest and cannot really ever fully reflect on changing 
conditions” (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011). Nevertheless, when seeking any 
viable concepts of the AC, it is essential to take into account the current context, 
circumstances and, above all, the goals and interests of the Arctic states.  
 
All the AC’s Member States have now published their northern policy documents. 
There are good reasons to think that the short and medium-term priorities of the 
Arctic governments will not be subject to previously observed seasonal fluctuation 
(Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007). Perhaps, these statements will positively 
contribute to balanced and far-reaching policy within the Arctic Council. 
Although the documents do not provide any explicitly stated ideas in respect to 
the reformation of the Council, it is possible to draw some conclusions and a 
general overview of the Arctic states’ approaches and, accordingly, a general 
framework within which any further considerations may be developed. 
  
What picture of the Arctic Council and possible role of non-Arctic actors emerges 
from the policies and strategies? It will come as no surprise that there are different 
views on how the AC should perform its role within the emerging international 
governance of the Arctic. In Canada’s view there is a need to increase policy 
dialogue within the AC, encourage implementation of guidelines, development of 
“best practices” (e.g. in ecosystem-based oceans management, cf. Hoel, 2009) and 
negotiation of new instruments (if applicable). Moreover, a strategic 
communications role for the forum should be developed. Importantly, the 
Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy articulates that although the “current 
informal nature [of the AC] (…) has served Canada well for many years (…) the 
growing demands on the organization may require changes to make it more 
robust” (Government of Canada, 2010). This means that Canada will “work with 
other Arctic states to develop options, including with respect to the role of the 
Council, related ‘secretariat’ functions, and funding issues” (Government of 
Canada, 2010). There is also a meaningful statement concerning non-Arctic actors, 
which are perceived as a challenge for the Permanent Participants. Canada, 
therefore, sees its own role in ensuring that the Permanent Participants’ central 
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role within the Council “is not diminished or diluted” (Government of Canada, 
2010). In addition, the “key foundation for any collaboration” with outside players 
will be their recognition of the Arctic states’ sovereignty and leadership in the 
management of the region (Government of Canada, 2010). 
 
To a certain extent, similar views are held by the United States. According to the 
American Arctic policy document “the Arctic Council should remain a high-level 
forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a 
formal international organization, particularly one with assessed contributions” 
(U.S. White House, 2009). Nevertheless, the U.S. allows for “updating the structure 
of the Council, including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, its 
subsidiary bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s 
work and are consistent with the general mandate of the Council” (U.S. White 
House, 2009). 
 
The Russian Arctic policy document entitled The Fundamentals of State Policy of 
the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period Up to 2020 and Beyond, may be 
seen as reflecting areas of particular interest and aspirations rather than presenting 
a consistent strategy to pursue objectives (Zysk, 2010), although it mentions the 
Arctic Council only once in reference to the strategic priority of the Russian 
Federation in enhancing co-operation in the Far North (Security Council of the 
Russian Federation, 2008). However, some more detailed insights were provided 
by the Russian SAO Anton Vasiliev at the 5th Northern Research Forum Open 
Assembly in Anchorage, Alaska in September 2008, a few days after the issuance of 
the strategy. In his opinion, it is important to keep “sustained in a very careful and 
responsible manner” balances between certain issues within the Council, including 
“scope of its activities and the character of its products”, “its internal arrangements 
and decisions and transparency and co-operation with non-member states and 
entities”, as well as the role of the Permanent Participants (Vasiliev, 2008). This 
may imply that, in his view, the balance within the Council is relatively fragile and 
every change could possibly affect it. Thus, it might be assumed that to maintain 
balance, any significant changes (such as a different mandate, reconstruction or an 
increased role and number of observers) should not be made. This interpretation 
is further supported, at least in case of non-Arctic actors, by media materials. Both 
the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy published in 2006 and its 
follow-up document from 2009 do not address any questions of possible reform of 
the Arctic Council (Norwegian MFA, 2006, 2009). However, according to the 
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Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre the Council should focus 
on “filling knowledge gaps, identifying appropriate adaptation and mitigation 
measures and drawing up strategies” (Støre, 2006). Furthermore, he sees the role of 
the AC in decision-shaping rather than decision-making (Støre, 2009). To 
complete the picture, Norway has expressed its openness and willingness to admit 
new Observers, as well as increase their role within the Council (see Støre; Støre, 
Støre 2010a; Støre, 2010b; Støre, 2010c). 
 
Contrary to the Norwegian and American positions, Denmark stated that the AC 
“must evolve from a decision-shaping to a decision-making organization” 
(Denmark, Greenland and Faroe Islands, 2011). The role of the forum as an 
“instrument exerting influence on nation states and international organizations” 
should be further strengthened. If it proves to be feasible, also decision-making 
actions should be pursued. To this end, it is essential to co-operate with all the 
states and organizations that may provide an input and can contribute to the 
Council’s activities (Denmark, Greenland and Faroe Islands, 2011). This also 
means, according to the Kingdom of Denmark, that policies and mechanisms 
“must be organized in close co-operation with other Arctic nations and other 
stakeholders [all relevant countries and organizations] with interest in the Arctic” 
(Denmark, Greenland and Faroe Islands, 2011). It is important to note that during 
its Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2009-2011) Denmark was exceptionally 
active with respect to Observers and strongly advocated for admission of actors 
awaiting status. This, however, met with continued reluctance from the other 
Arctic states, what became apparent also in the survey carried out by the Danish 
Chairmanship. Nevertheless, a caveat is made in respect with involvement of the 
European Union that it should be based on Northerners’ own terms. This 
originates in the EU’s restrictions imposed on the import of seal products, which 
was considered the main reason for rejection of application for its Observer status 
(cf. Phillips, 2009). Additionally, Denmark asserts that the Arctic Five formula will 
be retained as “an essential complementary [to the Arctic Council - PG] regional 
forum for the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean” (Denmark, Greenland and Faroe 
Islands, 2011). 
 
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Finnish, Swedish and Icelandic 
documents address the role of the Council vis-à-vis the Arctic Ocean Meetings 
(henceforth often referred to as the Arctic Five - A5). The origins of this formula 
can be traced back to the meeting at the level of senior officials held in Oslo on 15-
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16 October 2007 at the invitation of the Norwegian Government. Representatives 
of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states met to hold informal discussions on the 
international legal framework applying to the Arctic, particularly the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and its domestic implementation in different 
areas. This meeting provided the basis for the ministerial summit in Ilulissat, 
Greenland in May 2008, where the Ilulissat Declaration was issued. The last Arctic 
Ocean Meeting at the ministerial level took place in Chelsea, Québec on 29 March 
2010. A common feature of these three statements is that they, while recognizing 
the rights and interests of the Arctic Ocean coastal states, will make efforts to 
ensure that the AC is the premier forum for addressing and making decisions on 
regional issues (Prime Minister’s Office, 2010; Government of Sweden, 2011; 
Althingi, 2011). Furthermore, the extensive and detailed Finnish document offers a 
relatively comprehensive list of improvements to strengthen the AC’s position. 
According to Finland, a possible role for the AC within the regional governance 
structure is to co-ordinate and monitor already existing and new regulatory 
arrangements and treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) and supplementary sector-based regulations, also in regard to 
developments on land. Moreover, it could also review different international 
instruments and “identify potential regulatory gaps and overlaps” (Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2010). Finland encourages broadening the Council’s agenda to 
include new sectors, in addition to its current function of monitoring and 
assessing the Arctic environment. The forum should play the role of a place for 
strategic Arctic discussion. To this end, Finland proposes further development of 
the deputy-ministers meetings, and introduces the idea that the Arctic Summits 
could be held “from time to time to discuss the guidelines of Arctic policy more 
broadly” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2010). It also states that Observers could 
participate in such meetings “if necessary”. Interestingly, the Finns are favorably 
disposed to admit new Observers, even if it would require amending the 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (the Ottawa Declaration).  
 
At the opposite extreme, Sweden seems to ignore the growing outside interest in 
the Arctic. There is no single reference in either the Swedish AC Chairmanship 
programme (2011-2013) or the newly issued Arctic policy document to aspirations 
of non-Arctic actors in general and their participation as Observers in the Council 
in particular (Swedish MFA, 2011; Government of Sweden, 2011). Instead, Sweden 
focuses on an elevation of the AC’s rank by the inclusion of “important strategic 
issues such as joint security, infrastructure etc.” to its mandate. Furthermore, in 
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the Swedish view, development of more concrete projects and policy initiatives 
could energize co-operation within the Council and consequently reduce the need 
for the Arctic Five meetings (Government of Sweden, 2011). 
 
Another idea on how to stimulate the Arctic Council, but also the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC), has been suggested by Iceland. In the Icelandic strategy it 
is stated that the BEAC could be “plugged into the Arctic Council” in a formal 
manner, for instance, by holding joint ministerial meetings of both councils 
(Icelandic MFA, 2009). This would allow creating synergies, avoiding duplication 
of common goals as well as better utilization of human and financial resources 
(Icelandic MFA, 2009). It is also worth noting that Iceland supports strengthening 
the role of Observers and admitting new ones. Moreover, Icelanders acknowledge 
that these actors are very active within the AC’s Working Groups and that their 
work contributes to the success of the projects (Icelandic MFA, 2009). 
 
It can be seen from the foregoing that there is no common vision of the AC’s 
future, making any deliberation on the place of the AC in the evolving landscape 
of regional co-operation even more difficult. Appropriately, a new concept of AC 
reform should be kept within a framework set out by the convergence points of the 
above priorities for the member states, as it might be problematic to negotiate 
concessions from their positions declared in the policy documents. As a matter of 
fact, it cannot be ruled out that certain adjustments and trade-offs in different 
areas are possible; however, they are difficult to foresee at this stage.  
 
What conclusions emerge from these policies for a possible new concept? First and 
foremost, it seems fair to say that the AC should remain a high-level forum (not a 
formal organization) keeping its mandate in the present form. Although the 
majority of Arctic states would like to broaden the Council’s activities to include 
other issues, it is unlikely that they would change the “two-pillar” scope defined in 
the Ottawa Declaration, especially in respect to more controversial questions. On 
the other hand, it is possible that new sector-based regulations akin to the SAR 
agreement will be used instead. Bearing this in mind, it seems expedient to adhere 
to the existing general idea of mandate with possible sector amendments.  
 
Furthermore, the AC, in the combined view of the Arctic states, should keep its 
decision-shaping character rather than be transformed into a decision-making 
body. But there are, nonetheless, good reasons to think that discussion on this 
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question might be launched in the not-too-distant future. Since the scope of the 
term “decision-shaping” may  encompass many instruments and roles, including 
co-ordinative and consultative tasks, it is crucial to utilize this function as much as 
possible. Given that all the Member States agree to strengthen the forum 
internally, it may be assumed that there is a space for new arrangements that could 
enhance the dialogue, even including non-Arctic players.  
 
Although there are a number of references in the above documentation to the 
admission of new Observers, little is said on their role within the AC. It is 
important, therefore, to find ways of their inclusion that could be both acceptable 
for all the parties and consistent with the current mandate as well as newly issued 
criteria, which seems to be fully compatible with the Canadian statement. This 
question, evoking different reactions, seems to be the most challenging in the 
debate on the reform as it involves actors with different understanding of certain 
issues (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011). Successful reform concept must find a 
way to alleviate discrepancy in this regard.  
 
The point to be made here is that the AC is a product of the Arctic countries and 
that their formative function will remain the major shaping factor in the 
foreseeable future. Accordingly, their leading role at the AC should not be 
challenged and it should remain strictly regional in nature – with a decisive voice 
of the Member States. On the other hand, the Arctic countries must also take into 
account the international environment, the interdependencies of interested non-
Arctic actors and themselves in other intergovernmental institutions, and their 
mutual national interests. Therefore, to keep the new concept realistic, ideas being 
developed should seem possible to be introduced on the outlined basis and be 
congruent with the specific character of the region, Arctic states’ national interests 
and the existing international circumstances. 
 
 
The political context of the debate on 
the Arctic Council’s place in regional 
governance 
 
According to Oran Young, we are now witnessing the second significant state 
change of key international conditions in the Arctic that has brought the region 
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into the global limelight (Young, 2009a). Particularly, the publication of the Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) in 2004 introduced an iconic shift in 
perception of the Far North from the picture of a frozen desert to the image of the 
Arctic in change that may have (and perhaps have had) far-reaching impact on 
global awareness about Arctic affairs (Koivurova, 2009). 
 
The large and unforeseen response to the ACIA showed that the Council was 
inadequately prepared for this new global attention, especially in regard to the 
economic interest of outside actors in Arctic natural resources and shipping 
routes, and consequently, in the involvement in the Arctic Council, giving a clear 
signal for the need for change in this respect. Additionally, in August 2007, the 
world’s attention was drawn to the Arctic by the Russian expedition Arktika 2007, 
which planted a Russian flag on the sea bottom at the North Pole. This action can 
be seen as a symbolic introduction of the Arctic to the current geo-political debate. 
The Arctic has gained increased political, economic and strategic significance not 
only among the Arctic states. Several powerful outside players have also expressed 
their interest in access to both economic opportunities and governance structures 
in the region (Koivurova, 2009; Young, 2009a; Graczyk, 2011). Those already 
involved in the Arctic co-operation processes raised the question of improving 
their position within the AC (Graczyk 2011). Accordingly, the problem of number, 
role and justification of Observers’ presence emerged as one of the main points of 
discussion on the Council’s reform (SAO Report, April 2009; SAO Report, May 
2011; Graczyk, 2011). As indicated by the survey carried out by the Danish 
Chairmanship among the eight northern governments and the six Permanent 
Participants, there are still profound differences in respect to this issue. By the 
same token, the role of Observers is rather symbolic compared to their abilities 
and aspirations (Graczyk, 2011). 
 
The AC’s Member States seem to treat actors from outside the region cautiously 
and, despite favorable declarations, keep them at distance. Recently, even a shift 
towards more assertive statements could be observed. For example, the senior 
member of the Russian delegation to the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting (2011) 
commented for Kommersant:  
 
“Recently there is the rage for the Arctic, largely, of course, due to 
opening economic opportunities. At the same time, many countries 
which are irrelevant to the North Pole, do have a desire to chop off a 
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piece ‘of the Arctic pie’. If you give them the green light, soon there 
will be one hundred observers on board, who will gradually require 
more and more rights, and then insist on turning the Arctic in the 
‘universal humankind heritage’ on the model of the Antarctic.” 
(Chernenko, 2011). 
 
The argument invoked frequently by the Arctic states and the Permanent 
Participants is the possible suppression of the AC if the number of observers 
increased. This was clearly stated by a Canadian diplomat at the Nuuk Meeting:  
 
“Keeping in mind [the] failed climate conference in Copenhagen – the 
more members in the club, the harder it is to negotiate something, and 
there are questions in the Arctic, especially environmental ones that 
need to be addressed quickly.” (Chernenko, 2011; cf. AAC, 2007; ICC, 
2010) 
 
Lack of consensus on the Observer issue, despite the relatively high activity of the 
Danish Chairmanship in this regard, may lead to a weakening of the AC in the 
future. It is conceivable that rejected non-Arctic entities could look for other 
avenues for pursuing their interests, including through bilateral relations with the 
Arctic countries, other forums, or even by creating new structures (Larsen, 2011; 
Willis, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, such a way of dealing with regional issues, apart from the Council, 
has been constituted by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states at the ministerial 
meetings in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2008 and Chelsea, Québec in 2010. As 
mentioned above, it is also supported in the Canadian and Danish Arctic policy 
documents. On the first occasion these countries declared their commitment to the 
existing international legal framework pertaining to the Arctic Ocean, and 
expressed their view that there is no need for any new legal arrangements for the 
region, including a treaty (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). Continuation of meetings 
in this format, proposed by Canada to advance “[a] forward-looking dialogue on 
issues related to our [the coastal states’ – PG] roles and responsibilities in areas 
under our jurisdiction” (Cannon, 2010), may, however, be indicating a new trend 
in the circumpolar co-operation.  
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While the exclusion of Finland, Sweden and Iceland as well as the Permanent 
Participants at the summit in Ilulissat, although criticized, could have been 
justified by a single-case commitment to the existing international law and 
governmental nature of such declaration, the offer of the Arctic Ocean Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting in 2010 was met with rather harsh reactions not only from the 
rest of the Arctic States (particularly Iceland, CBC News, 2010b; SAO  Report, 
November 2007), IPOs (CBC News, 2010c), but also U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton (O’Neill and Boswell, 2010). Notwithstanding the Canadian government’s 
defence of the A5 summits focused “on issues of particular relevance to the Arctic 
Ocean coastal states, generally not dealt with in the Arctic Council” (CBC News, 
2010a), this formula may move the mainstream of regional co-operation towards 
bilateral relations and ad hoc meetings of interested countries (such as the A5), 
thereby marginalizing the Council (Heininen, 2007; Heininen, 2010; CCGS and 
WDGF, May 2011). 
 
On the other hand, it is also important to note that despite the significant changes 
that have occurred in the region since the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS) and its further development within the AC, the legal status of 
these instruments, mandate and institutional structure have not been significantly 
modified (Koivurova, 2010). Nonetheless, in recent years various initiatives and 
proposals to strengthen the AC in this regard have been undertaken by the 
Chairmanships (Norwegian MFA Report, April 2005; Norwegian MFA, 2008; The 
Kingdom of Denmark, April 2009), some of the Permanent Participants (AAC, 
2007; ICC, 2010) as well as by researchers examining Arctic institutions. By the 
same token, the commitment of the Arctic countries to reform the AC, with 
recognition of recent developments in this regard agreed in Nuuk, seems to be far 
from optimal from the beginning of the Arctic co-operation to the present day 
(Koivurova, 2009).  
 
Drawing these observations together, it may be concluded that the AC has reached 
the moment in which it must decide what role it should play in the years to come. 
Shall it be the central institution for policy decisions in the Arctic? Or rather, a 
low-profile assessment and discussion body marginalized by other arrangements 
like A5? It seems fair to say that it is high time the AC took appropriate steps to 
find a niche for its prospective activities (cf. Koivurova, 2009). Bearing the above 
picture in mind, we may attempt to offer a somewhat new view on the place of the 
Arctic Council in the future of Arctic governance. 
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The preceding analysis shows that the problem of adaptation to emerging 
circumstances is one of the most critical and complex for the Arctic Council. 
Presumptively, it would require a laborious negotiation process to reach a 
consensus on the future shape of this forum. Additionally, it is important to note 
that different models of the reform may be considered, employing categories such 
as focus (from narrow to cross-sectoral), outcome (legally/non-legally binding, 
creation of new institutions), as well as the place of the AC within the wider 
structure of international institutions and instruments (cf. Koivurova and 
Molenaar, 2010). 
 
The major focus of the AC should be, therefore, to act as a co-ordinative hub (cf. 
Young, 2009b) for a network of international agreements (legally and non-legally 
binding), instruments and organizations applicable to the Arctic. Such a role 
would imply linking and providing other international institutions with reliable, 
high quality and up-to-date knowledge and recommendations. The AC in this 
position would be also entitled to review these arrangements and identify gaps and 
overlapping issues pertaining to the Arctic, and in co-operation with their 
appropriate organs, would advocate the most proper method of resolution. 
Consequently, such a forum would need to address literally all issues concerning 
the region. Moreover, it should aim for the creation of instruments that could 
facilitate achieving legally-binding regulations at other institutions or in the form 
of separate treaties. After a review of a specific case (in appropriate subsidiary 
body – see below) there would be three possible actions to be made: 1) to refer an 
instance to the other and more relevant authority or institution (if such exists) 
which is mandated to deal with such specific areas, 2) to handle the case within the 
AC (if it corresponds to its mandate and activities), or 3) to create a new 
instrument (e.g. a treaty) to cover the issue (in a way similar to the SAR 
agreement). Selecting one of these options should be obligatory, binding and made 
by consensus. Although there are examples of successful efforts in this realm (the 
Århus Protocol on POPs, the Stockholm Convention on POPs) which give a good 
basis for further developments, it is still rather occasional and may be perceived as 
one of the most unused features of the Council, mainly due to lack of consensus. 
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This may, however, be about to change together with the adoption of the SAR 
agreement. 
 
These tasks are envisaged to strengthen the decision-shaping (or policy-shaping) 
function; nonetheless certain decision-making elements can also be noticed. The 
member states should consider whether negotiations of legally-binding sector 
instruments are better managed outside or under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council (but perceived as de facto AC products) instead of adding them to the AC 
competences. It is fair to say, however, that legitimacy of this function in the 
forum’s fundamental documents would increase the role of the Council 
significantly. The scope of sector agreements (that would be possible to negotiate 
within the AC) could be defined in advance in a detailed manner (e.g. security 
issues would be excluded) thus all the Member States could accept it.  
 
As noted above, it would be a third option and just a formal confirmation of the 
already established arrangement. The opponents may have, nevertheless, 
reservations about the status of such regulations and could consequently argue that 
indeed this would imply a shift towards an international organization with 
regulatory authority. In fact, the decision whether to use this measure would 
remain at the discretion of the Arctic States on the consensus basis. Although 
enacting legally-binding regulations requires a treaty-based organization, both the 
Ottawa Declaration and the Rules of Procedure do not preclude the launching and 
conducting of negotiations on legally-binding arrangements. Nevertheless, some 
amendments in this regard could be introduced to these documents to highlight 
this function of the Council. Still, when positively interpreted, the founding 
documents may be perceived as creating a space for arrangements of this kind 
even within the current mandate.  
 
It is, therefore, a task for the Arctic states to deal with the pros and cons of such a 
resolution and their key criterion should be efficiency. It means that they need to 
answer a question about whether regulative instruments would be better managed 
and implemented outside the Council or within it. Nevertheless, if the 
inconsistencies with some states’ policies would be too glaring (in their 
interpretation), for the time being the AC should further develop its role as a 
venue for negotiations on instruments operating externally. The important thing 
to note in this connection is that the Council should not compete with the existing 
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institutions and instruments but rather supplement, enhance and co-ordinate 
them.  
 
Being a leading forum dealing with circumpolar affairs implies fostering relations 
between the Arctic and other regional and global entities. The AC’s role in this 
regard should be not only co-operation with relevant institutions on regulations 
and governance of the region, but also drawing international public opinion’s 
attention to the problems of the Arctic and enriching its understanding of 
processes occurring there. To this end, the forum should increase the level of 
awareness of its very existence and activities, above all locally and regionally, and 
then, also globally. First and foremost, there is a need to enhance a “brand” of the 
Arctic Council and its stature as a premier source of well-established and reliable 
information on the Far North acknowledged by the Arctic states and involved 
non-Arctic actors. Communication with the rest of the world would require, in 
addition to scientific reports, a popular science approach based on intelligible 
messages distributed in the form of TV programs, newspaper articles, books, 
bulletins, etc. It is also important to develop a good platform for information flow 
between the Council (e.g. secretariat) and the mass media. There is, therefore, a 
need to enhance the AC’s capabilities in this field by the creation of a specialized 
section within the Secretariat.  
 
In this context, it seems also inevitable to enhance co-operation with southern 
states, which often are key players in various international institutions, but also 
may facilitate amplifying the voice of the Arctic Council domestically. A special 
role might be played by the European Union with all its means and possibilities of 
influence and promotion, both among the member states and places where it acts 
as a unified entity. Promotion of the AC’s goals and programs worldwide should 
be one of the most critical functions of observers concerned with the Arctic. To 
effectively perform this task it seems important to maintain a constant and 
continuous exchange of information, access to research activities within the 
Working Groups, as well as meetings of the Arctic Council. This issue indicates 
another challenging area where the AC needs to seek improvement in the 
immediate future. 
 
Along with increased interest in Arctic affairs, the outside actors aspire to be 
recognized as legitimate stakeholders in the region. Arctic states might be 
successful in blocking their efforts, as well as assuming an apt role within the AC 
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(Young, 2009a), but may find it difficult (if not impossible) to restrain the 
presence and activities of non-Arctic players in the Far North. Here the question 
emerges whether the Member States would prefer to have information about these 
developments in areas beyond their jurisdiction and maintain good relations with 
non-Arctic entities or close their own circle and allow the situation to unfold in an 
unco-ordinated manner. To avoid the latter scenario, Arctic states should analyze 
and take into consideration the goals and Arctic policies of these actors and 
envisage what potential alternatives to the AC are, which may prove to be 
detrimental to the Council itself as well as to regional co-operation and 
governance. Given that in all likelihood it takes place in the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of the Member States, these governments need to juxtapose their 
conclusions with each other and forge a common and balanced position. The new 
criteria for Observers (SAO Report, May 2011), although posing a step forward to 
settle the issue, seem rather to defer decisions on the applications, thus increasing 
impatience among non-Arctic actors and causing their sometimes harsh reactions 
(Larsen, 2011; Johnson, 2011). By the same token they have laid a foundation for a 
more restricted and cautious policy towards Observers aimed at discouraging 
rather than encouraging them to participate in the Council’s work (Graczyk, 
2011). Additionally, it may be easily seen from above that these criteria do not 
fully reflect all the publicly stated positions of the Member States in this respect. 
 
In this context, the Arctic Council should also take into account its role in the 
emerging security environment in the region. This does not mean dealing with 
military-related issues, excluded from its mandate, but rather seeking and 
establishing appropriate relations with organizations crafted for such purposes, 
namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – including the NATO-
Russia Council – and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). Both institutions have expressed their interest in developments in the Far 
North, thus pondering the consultative and informative role of the Council seems 
to be highly pertinent to keep it the central forum for Arctic affairs. 
Interconnectedness and interplay between the AC and the OSCE could generate 
synergies in security areas, especially as all the Arctic states are members of the 
OSCE. Furthermore, the Council could consider its role in promoting regional 
peace and stability through respect for justice and the rule of international law, by 
for instance, incorporating the chief principles of the Ilulissat Declaration (with 
possible amendments) to the AC’s fundaments, and making the parties of it also 
non-Arctic actors having interests and capabilities to operate in the Arctic (in a 
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manner corresponding to their presence in the region). This has been partly done 
in the criteria for Observers. 
 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the wider international and high politics dimension 
of the possible AC’s role, it is essential to preserve and further enhance the unique 
character of the forum focused on the local and indigenous inhabitants. This 
means that the Council should not evolve towards a typical regional organization 
with a predominant political level, but instead be based on a bottom-up principle 
with the Working Groups and the Permanent Participants as fundaments. Higher 
politicization and decisions being made far below the Arctic Circle without 
hearing the Northern voices would not solve problems of the region. On the 
contrary, involvement of indigenous peoples in decision-shaping processes and 
research programs laying groundwork for policy recommendations have proved to 
be a right way of addressing many issues emerging in the Arctic. Accordingly, due 
to the growing importance of scientific assessments, primarily those of the WGs, 
for the entire governance system in the Arctic region, certain improvements might 
be applied to Observer participation in the projects carried out by the Arctic 
Council’s Working Groups. 
 
The working level (comprising both the WGs and Task Forces) of the Arctic 
Council’s structure seems to be the most appropriate place to strengthen co-
operation with non-Arctic actors and to demonstrate their commitment to the 
problems of the Arctic and Northerners as well as the goals of the AC. On the 
other hand, it is also an opportunity for the AC to receive additional financial 
resources, scientific expertise, as well as new views and proposals that could 
contribute to energizing activities within the AC. It is understandable that their 
involvement should be of a supportive nature (with the leading role of the Arctic 
nations) however Observers should not be perceived merely as a source of funding 
and resources, but as full research partners. 
 
Currently, the AC does not seem to be ready to perform these functions unless the 
forum is substantially reformed. It will require concrete changes in the approach to 
its work and architecture. Thus, how can the Arctic Council structurally adapt to 
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The core issues pertaining to the structure include both questions of improvement 
of the existing bodies such as the Secretariat (ACS) and ideas for the creation of 
the new organs within the AC. These suggested arrangements have been narrowed 
to the most essential and involve as little resources as possible from the Arctic 
states for the sake of their limited willingness to increase financial commitments. 
 
To improve the AC’s performance at the highest levels it should maintain the 
current non-binding nature of decisions and remain a decision-shaping rather 
than decision-making forum. However, as mentioned above, it seems that even 
with this caveat there is a room for certain improvements in this regard. First and 
foremost, there is a need to ensure efficient and well-established strategic planning 
in long- and medium-term perspectives. To this end a new political arrangement 
could be created, namely the Arctic Summits as proposed by Finland in its policy 
document. They would have a form of strategic conference (perhaps on the level of 
Prime Ministers) held every six to eight years (e.g. after completion of four 
subsequent chairmanships held by half of the AC member states), which could 
gather representatives of all the stakeholders (also non-Arctic) to discuss priority 
problems in the years to come, as well as to outline directions and goals in dealing 
with them. This would establish a framework for the AC’s work for the next 
decade, ensuring a comprehensive and coherent approach. In addition, such 
meetings would undoubtedly draw the world’s attention to the problems of the 
Arctic. Needless to say, the forum should also maintain the ability to react quickly 
to emerging and pending issues. 
 
Chairmanships would operate within these schemes and could add their own 
objectives in line with the general plan. Biennially held Ministerial Meetings would 
do their current work and review sub-goals for the next chairmanship to keep it in 
accordance with the agreed strategic directions. This task could be supplemented 
by further developed meetings of Deputy Ministers, which could become sectoral 
in nature, gathering deputy ministers entitled to make decisions on specific issues 
discussed (e.g. ministers of transport, natural resources, and environment).  
 
A novel feature that could contribute to more robust discussions within the Arctic 
Council is a group (committee) of experts (“wise men”) that would be responsible 
for directing the debate on Arctic-wide matters by delivering their expertise to the 
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PMs (at the Arctic Summits), ministers and deputy ministers, for instance, in the 
form of a keynote speech. This group would also serve as an advisory body that 
could be consulted both at the meetings and in periods between them (also by the 
SAOs if necessary). Its key role would be to stimulate the discussion on emerging 
issues and phenomena that need to be addressed by politicians. The more direct 
interaction could prove to be essential in the region of rapid changes. It is an open 
question who should be part of this group, but there should be places for 
distinguished scholars encompassing different fields of Arctic science. It is 
conceivable that it could emerge from enhanced co-operation between the AC and 
the International Arctic Science Committee, the Northern Research Forum, as well 
as the International Arctic Social Science Association. 
 
While these arrangements are believed to elevate the Arctic Council’s status and 
trigger in-depth and intense discussions on a wide range of Arctic issues, the AC 
should focus on co-ordination of regional affairs without having to deal directly 
with issues that are controversial or excluded from its mandate. To act effectively 
as a co-ordinative hub for a set of international agreements and organizations, the 
Council needs to both initiate new processes and review existing ones in other 
bodies. It is critical to ensure that the Arctic Council has a say in any international 
agreement with relevance to the Arctic.  
 
This role should be performed at all levels of the Arctic Council’s structure. At the 
political plane, comprising Arctic Summits, ministerial and vice-ministerial 
meetings, it could be considered to hold joint conferences with apparent 
institutions (when a certain issue is to be deliberated), for instance, representatives 
of the International Maritime Organization could be invited to the Ministerial or 
Deputy Ministerial Meetings in the case of discussions on the “Polar Code” or the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) recommendations follow-up. 
Moreover, the form of joint sessions of two (or more) organizations, for example, 
the AC and the BEAC, should also seek to achieve synergies and reduce overlaps. 
The critical role of the Arctic Summits in this respect would be to initiate 
discussions on strategic legally- binding instruments regarding the Arctic that 
should be pursued in other institutions (presumptively requiring laborious 
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To increase chances of success for political projects in this regard, it would be 
necessary to adjust the operating level to these new needs. The most pertinent 
seems to be the creation of a working group or appropriate legal unit within the 
Secretariat which would review and trace all international instruments and 
institutions having any impact on the Arctic and could prepare expert reports 
recommending decisions for ministers in accordance with the “three-option” 
model and suggest steps forward. This special organ would also monitor domestic 
implementation of relevant international agreements and the AC’s 
recommendations among the Arctic (and possibly involved non-Arctic) states.  
 
With regard to the Arctic Council Secretariat, further changes and redesign would 
be required. Above all, it seems inevitable to expand its structure by developing 
different units focused on specific areas. It should be capable to provide an 
institutional memory (archive, information centre, ensured continuity), legal 
services (review of international institutions and linkages to them, expert 
recommendations – if a special WG was not created) and currently performed 
tasks (SAO Report, May 2011). Moreover, it may be particularly useful to develop 
communications and outreach, media relations, or even a marketing unit that 
would strengthen the Council’s visibility. In addition, the Indigenous Peoples 
Secretariat (IPS) should be integrated with the ACS, as proposed in the SAO 
Report to Ministers at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting (SAO Report, May 2011). 
This could both elevate the status of indigenous peoples (they would have their 
own unit and co-chair in the secretariat of the intergovernmental institution) as 
well as would add indigenous insight into the work of the ACS. This could also 
help to reduce costs and contribute to more efficient co-operation with the 
Permanent Participants. Relatively well-positioned SAOs should further supervise 
these developments, however, it comes as no surprise that their meetings most 
likely would have to be extended or become more frequent to cover all the issues. 
 
A more intriguing question perhaps is how to tackle the Observer issue in a way 
that meets all the parties’ needs. First and foremost, it is apparent that the current 
arrangements are not entirely fit for this purpose, especially in relation to 
communication between the Arctic states and Observers. A good step forward may 
be the idea of an Information Symposium held for the first time along with the 
Deputy Ministers Meeting in May 2010 in Copenhagen. Nevertheless, given a 
rather informative and brief character of presentations, this form of 
communication is not sufficient to conduct an effective and substantive dialogue; 
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neither is it possible at the SAO nor (deputy) ministerial meetings. There is, 
therefore, a need to develop and regularize an additional channel of 
communication with accredited Observers.  
 
A new arrangement could be modeled on the informal Warsaw meeting (March 
2010) between all the state (and EU) Observers and the SAO Chair representing 
the Danish Chairmanship. Such a format allows free discussions on the most 
pending issues without disrupting the work of the Council. In addition, these 
meetings could be organized by Observer states that would not require any 
additional effort from the Arctic states except for the presence of its representative. 
The SAO Chair would be responsible for circulation of the meeting’s conclusions 
among the other Member States and the Permanent Participants and perhaps it 
could be discussed (if particularly relevant) at the SAO Meetings or further 
addressed (with reply from the Arctic states and the PPs) at the next meeting of 
this kind. Other guests, such as IPOs or IPS representatives, could also be invited. 
In addition, it is envisaged that Observers would be entitled to sit at the table and 
speak during the Arctic Summits. 
 
Nonetheless, the fundamental question centers on a practical involvement of 
Observers into the Council’s work. The main emphasis should be placed on their 
scientific contribution within the WGs and Task Forces. All the state Observers 
carry out well-established and dynamic polar research programs that may provide 
the ACs projects with additional knowledge and experience, but also facilities and 
resources. Yet, it is accurate to say that their possible input is not (for many 
reasons) utilized sufficiently. It seems, therefore, necessary to improve a 
mechanism for incorporating Observers’ scientists into the WGs and TFs activities 
and avoid politicization of this level of the Arctic Council’s structure. Inclusion of 
non-Arctic researchers should be based on substantial consideration as well as the 
search for synergies and linkages between the AC’s projects and polar programs of 
southern institutes.   
 
Making progress toward the achievement of these goals would require the 
participation of representatives of research centers from non-Arctic countries at 
the meetings of WGs and TFs with the right to propose new projects, especially 
those ones they would wish to finance. The chief idea behind this arrangement is 
that the WGs should operate as international research institutions, taking into 
account the quality of the projects and the researchers’ backgrounds rather than as 
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an extension of political organs. To further equalize the position of non-Arctic 
states at the working level, Observers should provide input to the AC’s project 
budget (Project Support Instrument), in addition to ad hoc funding. An 
application procedure based on the new criteria should allow the Member States to 
discard the last concerns about an Observers’ participation in the AC research 
programs. 
 
The soft law nature of the Arctic Council makes the question of efficiency 
exceptionally important and challenging. This is particularly apparent with respect 
to the implementation of guidelines and recommendations which frequently have 
no follow-up activities. As a result, the AC’s projects do not fully comply with 
their role and there is no information on how efficacious the AC’s effort is. There 
are no simple solutions to the problem, but one way forward may be the creation 
of a mandatory mechanism to monitor the scope of implementation of programs, 
and to encourage the Arctic states to introduce recommendations to their 
domestic legal orders. Being in a good position to perform such tasks could prove 
to be the above described unit within the Secretariat, which could be based on the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment WG (PAME) experiences in 
monitoring activities related to the AMSA follow-up. The procedure would involve 
periodical reports on how the states act on approved recommendations, what the 
level of implementation is and how much time would they need to apply certain 
solutions. On this basis, the unit would create a summary report on the status of 
implementation of specific recommendations, which would be presented at the 
SAO meetings. Such a mechanism could also contribute to increase capabilities 
related to the institutional memory. 
 
Respectively, compliance information and the effectiveness of regional co-
ordination would depend largely on the unit and its reports for decision-making. 
This supplementary body should ensure the exchange of information between the 
AC and these (or on these) institutions and search for the best proposals for filling 
in possible gaps and avoiding overlaps with respect to international regulations 
pertaining to the Arctic. Potential recommendations could include involvement of 
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It is difficult to predict which of the proposed ideas are possible to implement, and 
to what extent they would meet the interest of the Arctic states. The premise of 
this paper in terms of implementation is to maximize utilization of the existing 
structures and minimizing the need for (protracted) negotiations, the outcomes of 
which may be far from expectations. There are certain arrangements and 
mechanisms already in place that may give a good basis for further development of 
the solutions offered by the present article. The majority of the decisions could be 
made by the ministers of the Member States, building on the already functioning 
framework. This applies, for instance, to the establishment of new working groups 
or decisions relating to the Secretariat. The ministers would also play a key role in 
convincing leaders of their governments about the idea of arranging the Arctic 
Summits with their participation. But it would be equally appropriate to develop 
further feasibility studies (especially to its legal and operational feasibility). 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of permanent consultative meetings with Observers 
can easily be enhanced and expanded on the basis of the three previous meetings 
(in Brussels, London and Warsaw) and the experience of the entities that 
organized them. In addition, they could still be held in the Observer states, which 
could increase interest and provide reliable information on the Arctic co-
operation, as well as promote the AC itself in the South (press coverage would be 
highly recommended), and contribute to outreach and communication in non-
Arctic countries. One of the ideas for advancing implementation of the suggested 
actions may be a special conference (different from the ordinary AC meetings) on 
the reform of the AC which would have powers to make certain decisions or 
launch specific processes (including negotiations) leading to establishment of the 
proposed arrangements. The latter action could be also performed by the ministers 





The Arctic Council should remain a venue where interested actors (Arctic and 
non-Arctic) meet to solve real problems of the region, not only to assess and make 
recommendations, but to co-ordinate joint actions and develop mechanisms that 
review how adopted guidelines are implemented in domestic policies. 
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Simultaneously, any reforms should not be forced. It is the nature of international 
processes that any imposed actions, to which states have not yet matured, may do 
more harm than good. Changes within the AC should be a continuous process of 
adaptation to the dynamically changing environment.  
 
However, some innovations are needed today. One of these is a question about the 
involvement of non-Arctic actors. They should add value, not cause problems. 
Joint research carried out under the auspices of the Arctic Council seems to be one 
of its most valuable achievements. Development of recommendations by scientists 
from many countries (including non-Arctic ones) contributes not only to a 
possession of the same and common knowledge, which is a basis for further 
action, but also enables learning from each other, understanding problems of 
individual countries from the earliest stages of decision-making processes, thereby 
increasing the potential for further peaceful co-operation. But if the AC became a 
more politicized body, i.e. if high politics and national interests dominated the 
Council’s work and influenced its shape, it is highly possible that its unique 
position and impact on the region would melt.  
 
This paper has attempted to devise a profile of the Arctic Council in the years to 
come. It becomes more and more apparent that the AC cannot remain just a 
“study and talk” forum for discussion about the environment and sustainable 
development (Koivurova and VanderZwaag, 2007). Instead, the AC should 
increase its engagement in areas critical for the region, which includes not just the 
impact of oil and gas extraction, or increased marine shipping, but also issues that 
may pose a challenge for the spirit of co-operation in the Arctic. The member 
states should bear in mind both realms in which the Arctic Council has proved to 
be successful and those which it should cover in the forthcoming years. The intent 
behind this is to raise the AC’s role, so that the key players would not search for 
other avenues to handle their interests, while maintaining balance and the bottom-
up structure. However, the present study has also revealed that there is no 
common vision for the Council’s future among the Member States. Overcoming 
these differences seems to be the issue of paramount importance in making any 
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Annex 1: The new balance within the 
Arctic Council 
 
Given the preceding analysis and subsequent conclusions, this section outlines 14 
major recommendations based on research findings to make the key ideas more 
apparent. When searching for a new balance within the AC the following 
propositions may be considered: 
 
Recommendation 1 
The Arctic Council should adhere to the existing general idea of the mandate with 
possible new sector-based regulations akin to the SAR agreement. 
 
Recommendation 2 
The Arctic Council should utilize its “decision-shaping” function as much as 
possible since it may include many instruments and roles, including co-ordinative 
and consultative tasks. Given that all the Member States agree to strengthen the 
forum internally, it may be assumed that there is a space for new arrangements 
that could enhance the dialogue, also with non-Arctic players.  
 
Recommendation 3 
The formative, decisive and leading role of the Arctic states should not be 
challenged, and the Arctic Council should remain strictly regional in nature, albeit 
bearing in mind the international environment and the importance of the Arctic 
for the entire planet, as well as legitimate interests and the presence of external 
actors and interdependencies of the regional and global institutions. 
 
Recommendation 4 
The unique character of the forum focused on the local and indigenous 
inhabitants should be preserved and enhanced. This means that the Arctic Council 
should not evolve towards typical regional organization with a predominant 
political level, but instead be based on a bottom-up principle with the working 
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A major focus of the Arctic Council should be to act as a co-ordinative hub for a 
network of international agreements (legally and non-legally binding), instruments 
and organizations regarding the Arctic, addressing literally all issues concerning 
the region by linking and providing other international institutions with reliable, 
high-quality and up-to-date knowledge and recommendations. This role should be 
performed at all levels of the Arctic Council’s structure. Accordingly, certain 
formalized actions to close identified gaps in regional governance architecture 
should be developed. 
 
Recommendation 6 
The Arctic Council should be able to draw international public attention to the 
problems of the Arctic and enrich its understanding of processes occurring there. 
To this end, the forum should increase the level of awareness of its very existence 
and activities by, in addition to scientific reports and assessments, a popular 
science approach based on intelligible messages distributed in a range of measures. 
An effective platform for information flow between the AC and the mass media by 
the creation of a specialized section within its secretariat should be considered.  
 
Recommendation 7 
One of the most essential functions of observers should be to promote the AC’s 
goals and programs domestically and woldwide. To effectively perform this task it 
is important to maintain a constant and continuous exchange of information and 




Co-operation with non-Arctic actors should be strengthened, first and foremost, at 
the working level (comprising both the WGs and TFs) of the Arctic Council’s 
structure. The mechanism of incorporating Observers’ scientists into the WGs and 
TFs should be improved by the creation of a permanent place for researchers from 
Observer states and organizations filled by agreement between these entities 
depending on their resources and interests. Inclusion of non-Arctic scientists 
should be based on a substantial consideration as well as a search for synergies and 
linkages between the AC’s projects and polar programs of southern institutes, 
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taking into account the quality of the projects and the researchers’ backgrounds. 
Politicization of this level should be avoided. 
 
Recommendation 9 
The Arctic Council should take into account its role in the emerging security 
environment in the region by promoting regional peace and stability through 
respect for justice and the rule of international law and consider interplay with 
security institutions. This does not mean dealing with military related issues 
excluded from its mandate, but rather seeking and establishing appropriate 
relations with organizations crafted for such purposes, namely the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) including the NATO-Russia Council.  
 
Recommendation 10 
A new format for the Arctic Summit should be created to ensure efficient and 
well-established strategic planning through a long- and medium-term perspective. 
The purpose of these meetings would be to gather representatives of all the 
stakeholders (also non-Arctic) and establish a framework of the Arctic Council’s 
work for the next decade. Observers (as invited guests) should be entitled to sit at 
the table and speak during the Arctic Summits. 
 
Recommendation 11 
To enhance critical discussions within the Arctic Council, the creation of a group 
(committee) of experts (“wise men”) should be considered. Its task would be to 
direct the debate on Arctic-wide matters by delivering their expertise to the Arctic 
Summits, ministers and deputy ministers meetings, for instance in the form of a 
keynote speech. The committee would also serve as an advisory body and could be 
consulted both at the meetings and periods in between.  
 
Recommendation 12 
To further develop and regularise an additional channel of communication with 
accredited observers, a new arrangement – modeled on the informal Warsaw 
meeting (March 2010) between all the state (and EU) Observers and the SAO 
Chair – should be introduced. This format would allow free discussions on the 
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most pending issues without disrupting the work of the AC and would contribute 
to common understanding of the problems occurring in the region.   
 
Recommendation 13 
The creation of a mandatory mechanism to monitor implementation status and to 
encourage the Arctic states to introduce recommendations to their domestic legal 
orders is of great importance to improve the effectiveness of the Arctic Council. A 
specially designed unit within the secretariat could prove to be in a good position 
to perform such tasks. 
 
Recommendation 14 
Different units/posts focused on specific areas should be developed within the 
Arctic Council Secretariat. They should be capable to provide institutional 
memory, legal services, communications and outreach efforts, as well as currently 
performed tasks. In addition, the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) could be 
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